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Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both....
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.
    Robert Frost
R
obert Frost, in very simple but poetic language,
tells us that in life, we do have difficult choices to
make. Unfortunately, what appears as a plain fact
of lifethe trade offis usually lost amidst the great
desire to have ones cake and eat it at the same time.
This Policy Notes issue suggests the need to give
greater attention to and care in using tax and expendi-
ture policy to achieve several and, sometimes, conflict-
ing objectives. An understanding of the difficult fiscal
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choices facing the economy will thus help policymakers
arrive at informed decisions.
The nature of the beast
Several critical fiscal choice issues present them-
selves in the emerging world environment. There is of
course the overriding need to continue the present re-
gime of low inflation and price stability. More importantly,
however, the overall fiscal policy objective, as the economy
grows, is to create a policy environment which would al-
low more private investment and higher factor productiv-
ity. This suggests that the government must start to con-
sider fiscal policy, in particular tax policy, not only as a
tool for macroeconomic stabilization or revenue genera-
tion but also as a potent tool for influencing consump-
tion and investment decisions of economic agents.
The myopic view of fiscal policy is to regard taxa-
tion simply as a tool for generating substantial revenues
and to look at expenditure policy as an instrument to
offset the deadweight losses arising from distortionary
taxation. Thus, a government should raise as much tax
revenues as possible, regardless of any distortionary im-
pact on private economic agents consumption and in-
vestment decisions, and then the appropriate expendi-
ture policy will offset the distortion so created. It is as if

*This draws on Gilberto M. Llanto, "Fiscal Policy in an Emerging
World Environment." A paper presented to the Emerging World Environ-




have a tendency to propose revenue-eroding laws that
are without much economic justification.1 Burgess and
Stern argue that the identification of important and costly
areas for government intervention does not warrant ex-
tensive government action per se. They further point out
that even in systems where government is honest and
constructive, one has to take into serious account the
cost of raising resources whenever a spending item is
proposed. Thus, the difficult fiscal choice to make is to
identify the appropriate mode of financing (most prefer-
ably, a tax or group of taxes) that will be used to finance
an expenditure item. The relative costs and disadvan-
tages of the financing instrument must be thoroughly dis-
cussed, and if possible, made known to the public. Fol-
lowing Bahl, a good rule for debt finance is that borrow-
ing should be limited by the growth in the economys
taxable capacity, the present level of debt burden and
the intrinsic value of projects. Given the known limita-
tions and pitfalls of debt finance or money creation, the
only viable, long-term funding source is taxation, and no
other.2
The composition of government expenditures is as
important as its aggregate value. That expenditure policy
should give greater attention to investment in human
capital, e.g., basic education, nutrition and health, seems
commonplace. However, while there has been an attempt
to provide the social sectors more resources relative to
the other sectors, the resources such as those in the
education sector have not been used for the most so-
cially useful expenditure item, namely, basic education.
Manasan, Llanto and Nuqui (1996) pointed out that the
need for greater investment in basic education can be
appreciated in the context of the rapid development sus-
tained by the neighboring countries. Those countries made
better use of their respective labor forces skills and train-
expenditure policy can be an effective remedial tool for
distortionary taxation.
This Notes suggests a different way of looking at
fiscal policy in that it affects consumption and invest-
ment decisions. If the economy were to be competitive in
the world marketplace, it has to look at fiscal policy from
a nontraditional perspective.
What critical fiscal choices are there in the future?
To be or not to be
Should there be growth in public expenditures or a de-
cline in taxes and borrowings?
The traditional view seems to be that there should
be increased tax effort in order to raise the revenues
that will finance the growing public expenditures. This is
fine. Nobody will quarrel about the need to raise sub-
stantial revenues to finance public expenditures. How-
ever, while taxation and expenditure should be analyzed
together, the problem is not simply using taxes to fund a

1Consider, for example, the legislative proposal to establish and fund
a "tobacco bank" for tobacco farmers. We might as well have a "jeepney
drivers' bank" or a "bank for the disabled."
2Burgess and Stern forcefully argued this point, cautioning against
borrowing which will increase taxation or reduce expenditure in the fu-
ture or money creation which is inflationary. The latter has many
distortionary effects on markets (Sachs 1989, Buiter 1989).
fixed, exogenously given expenditure (Burgess and Stern).
Expenditures are financed by taxation, borrowing or money
creation. Considering the relative costs and disadvantages
of these different instruments used to finance expendi-
ture, one has to carefully find a good justification for even
suggesting a particular expenditure item. Bahl (1992)
pointed out that the government should not take an in-
terventionist approach except where the presence of
important externalities demands it. Tax, trade and indus-
trial policies should be coordinated and should interfere
as little as possible with the market.
The sad thing, however, is that some legislators
"...The difficult fiscal choice to make is to
identify the appropriate mode of financing,
most preferably a tax or group of taxes, that
will be used to finance an expenditure item."3
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ing to create more jobs and wealth. This would have been
impossible without a strong foundation in basic educa-
tion which is a requirement for a competitive work force.
If good basic education were the key to a future competi-
tive labor force, then the difficult choice lies in providing
adequate support to basic education and privatizing state
colleges and universities which provide tertiary educa-
tion.3
A decline in the infrastructure budget has long-term
implications on future economic growth and the competi-
tiveness of the economy. However, neglect of recurrent
expenditures may also require more capital expenditures
to replace assets that have deteriorated because of poor
maintenance. It will be important to determine recent
changes and future trends in sectoral allocation of ex-
penditures and to establish whether there is some sig-
nificant relationship between the share of government
expenditure allocated to infrastructure and/or the level
of total expenditure on infrastructure and growth in GDP.
In other words, it will be interesting to find out the impact
of public expenditure on private investment decisions.
This way, the suggestion to deploy more resources to
physical infrastructure may be justified relative to other
schemes such as fiscal incentives, which have been as-
sumed to be significant determinants of private invest-
ment decisions.
Should fiscal incentives be used to promote certain
sectors, e.g., tradable sector?
The interesting issues gravitate around the debate
between having a tax structure favoring tradables, on the
one hand, and having a more neutral tax policy across
sectors and transactions, on the other. For instance, Ko-
rea used tax policy to promote changing economic objec-
tives in different ways. In the outward-oriented phase of
its economic expansion (1961-72), it used rebates of
direct and indirect taxes on exports to encourage growth.
In its most recent trade liberalization and structural ad-
justment phase (1980-89), the revenue-raising potential
of the value added tax played an important role in mov-
ing toward tax policy neutrality.4
Market forces and appropriately-structured tax in-
centives are said to provide the impetus for private in-
vestments, especially in the tradable sector which will
bring about economic growth. Market forces determine
the volume and allocation of private investments while
tax policy is a critical factor in investment decisions. Thus,
it is argued that investment opportunities in the tradable
sector will be enhanced by providing generous tax incen-
tives, such as tax holidays, accelerated depreciation, and
others. This, however, calls for a better understanding of
the relationship between tax incentives and market in-
vestment decisions.
The problem with the tax or fiscal incentives ap-
proach is that the expectation arising from the grant of
tax incentives is not confirmed by research. Recent re-

3Again, this is not a popular idea. It seems creating new SUCs pro-
vides more political capital and good press copy.
4Irene Trela and John Whalley, "Taxes, Outward Orientation and
Growth Performance in the Republic of Korea," World Bank, 1991.
5Mario Lamberte, "Attracting Foreign Direct Investments to the Phil-
ippines," Development Research News XI, Jan-Feb 1993 and Rafaelita
Mercado-Aldaba, "Foreign Direct Investments in the Philippines: A Re-
assessment," PIDS Research Paper Series No. 94-10, 1994.
6Aldaba, ibid.
search5 indicates that the tax incentives have an insig-
nificant role in attracting foreign direct investments. In
contrast, the availability of infrastructure is one of sev-
eral factors significantly influencing investment flows. Not
only has the countrys investment incentive system been
an insignificant determinant of investments, it has also
served "to reinforce the import-substituting nature of the
economy.6" In addition, generous tax holidays have eroded
"Not only has the country's investment
incentive system been an insignificant deter-
minant of investments, it has also served to




the tax base and the tax effort of the economy. The low
tax effort means insufficient resources will be at hand to
build the soft and hard infrastructure for competitiveness.
Thus, it may be a choice between generating sufficient
revenues for infrastructure and providing tax incentives
to domestic and foreign investors because of the expec-
tation of higher levels of investment.
Bahl (1992) has an excellent argument against the
interventionist bias of tax incentives. He argues that the
cost of tax incentives in terms of revenue loss (not to
mention the distortions in preferences) must be made
up with a higher tax rate (or level of taxation, if you may)
somewhere else in the system. The real cost will likely
be in terms of slower economic growth because of the
higher nominal rates elsewhere in the system, distortions
in economic choices and the revenue loss. The unfortu-
nate thing is that there may be few opportunities for re-
placing the revenue loss arising from tax incentives as
shown by Philippine experience.
The use of tax incentives creates a bias for the
growth of particular types of  desired economic activities
or sectors. This leads to a lack of tax neutrality across
economic sectors. It is desirable to move toward a greater
tax neutrality across economic sectors, institutions, trans-
actions and financial instruments. This will enhance the
efficiency of the economy which is a necessary require-
ment of competitiveness. The implication is that tax policy
must not tilt in favor of a particular sector, e.g., the trad-
able sector, or a particular activity, e.g., import substitu-
tion. A neutral tax policy allows for the nimbleness which
firms or individuals must have in order to stay competi-
tive in a rapidly-changing world. In other words, it will be
costly for the economy to have a tax policy locked up in
favor of certain sectors or activities. Tax policy which is
biased toward certain sectors or transactions will lead to
resource misallocation.

7The combination of broad-based and low-rate taxation will per-
haps yield more revenue than a regime of narrow tax base and high rates.
Taxpayer resistance to high rates leads to tax evasion and smuggling.
The best approach to attracting foreign investment
and re-attracting flight capital is to ensure a stable macro-
economic performance buttressed by political stability.
Low and steady rate of inflation, small deficits on the
government and trade accounts and a stable exchange
rate will do more to attract and retain economic activity
than will the most attractive package of targeted incen-
tives (Bahl 1992). Thus, broadening the tax base and
lowering the tax rate across sectors would seem to be a
better choice for attracting investment capital. It seems
that the job of motivating investments in the tradable
sector falls squarely on the exchange rate policy and not
on fiscal policy. Fiscal policys job is to lay down a level
playing field by providing all sectors access to soft and
hard infrastructure financed by broad-based and low-rate
taxation.7
Should taxation of income be motivated  by economic
efficiency or by vertical equity?
A major tax policy issue concerns the taxation of
income. Shirazi and Shah (1991) observed that the em-
phasis on the redistributive role of the tax system is gradu-
ally waning due to widespread tax evasion. Progressivity,
of course, still seems to be treasured in the political
agenda but it seems that the failure to have an effec-
tively progressive income tax has consigned vertical eq-
uity to the bottom of priority fiscal reforms. Nonetheless,
the idea refuses to die. Thus, Congress has proposed a
relatively very high level of personal exemptions which
exceeds the poverty threshold for a family of six. If the
intention is simply to exclude from tax the income spent
on basic necessities and survival, then the proposal is
an overkill. Not only does it erode the already diminished
income tax base, it is actually anti-poor. It provides pro-
"... It will be costly for the economy to




measure of simplicity. The fiscal choice then is
between the more pragmatic and realistic eco-
nomic efficiency (i.e., revenue and simplicity)
and the more politically attractive but elusive
"vertical equity." Table 1 shows the tax base
index, an indicator of the coverage of the indi-
vidual income tax, and the high tax bracket in-
dex, an indicator of equity of the individual in-
come tax.8 A zero tax base index implies that all
incomes are taxed. A tax base index of 0.11
(Japan) means that 11 percent of average fam-
ily income is not taxed. In the Philippines, about
20 percent of average family income is not taxed.
On the other hand, a high tax bracket index of
3.08 under the countrys existing individual in-
come taxation means that the top marginal rate
of 30 percent will apply to a significant fraction of taxpay-
ers. The reduced high tax bracket index of the CTRP in-
come tax reform package for individuals will reduce the
coverage of that tax.
On a positive note, the proposed rate schedule for
individual income taxes will apply to both compensation
and business income. This will take away the disincen-
tive effects to individuals receiving the same amount of
income but facing different tax rates because the incomes
come from different sources.9
The remaining issue concerns the taxes on passive
income. The government shifted to a schedular individual
income taxation in 1981 because of the difficulty of tax-
ing interest income on bank deposits and dividend in-
come on a global basis. Administrative efficiency gave
way to progressivity. This is fine for as long as all passive
incomes are subjected to the same withholding rate. At
present, interest income on bank deposits, treasury bills
Tax base index High tax bracket index
portionately bigger tax benefit to the middle and high
income class who really do not need it. The poor or at
least those falling in the poverty threshold income do
not enjoy it because in the first place, they are not liable
to income tax.
The more popular tack is having few tax brackets
and lower marginal rates. Simplicity and ease in tax ad-
ministration seem to be preferred to progressivity. This
is seen in the countrys modified gross income tax (MGIT)
scheme for compensation income started in 1981 which
used a lower and flatter tax rate structure compared to
the previously-used global net income tax scheme with
steeply progressive rates. The harder-to-tax self-employ-
ment income of professionals and unincorporated busi-
ness was taxed according to the simplified net income
tax scheme (SNITS) which disallowed expenses that are
easily subject to abuse. At present, the government has
proposed to Congress further modifications of the income
tax system, including those applying to corporations.
Manasan (1997) critiques the proposed income tax
reform under the Comprehensive Tax Reform Program
(CTRP), calling it a "taxing problem." The overall verdict
seems to be that the legislation versions are revenue
losers while that of the government achieves incremen-
tal revenue (noted elsewhere in this paper) and some

8Tax base index refers to the ratio of the threshold taxable family
income of the typical household to the average family income. High tax
bracket index refers to the ratio of the minimum income at which the
highest marginal tax rate begins to be applicable to the average family
income (Manasan 1997).
9See Manasan (1997) for an extended discussion.
Existing system 0.203   3.082
House Bill no. 9077 0.613   3.082
Senate Bill no. 454 0.289   1.540
Other Countries
Thailand 0.121 15.220
Japan 0.110   6.930
United States 0.120   2.340
____________
Source:  Table 2, Manasan (1997)
Table 1. Tax Base Index and High Tax Bracket Index6
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and other securities are subject to a 20 percent final
withholding tax. On the other hand, capital gains on real
property accruing to individuals are imposed a tax of 5
percent of gross selling price of the real property. Capital
gains on shares of stocks are taxed differently depend-
ing on whether the share is listed or not listed in the
stock exchange.
What is the implication for competitiveness? A tax
measure which simply erodes the revenue base and thus
leads to revenue loss without clear and certain compen-
sating gains in efficiency and equity is a bad measure.
Such is the income tax reform version of Congress. The
revenue loss will impact on the ability of the economy to
finance the soft and hard infrastructure for competitive-
ness. On the part of economic agents, private invest-
ment decisions will not be determined by comparative
advantage but by the extent of effective protection pro-
vided by distortionary taxation.
Should government become more decentralized or cen-
tralized?
This question is new for some countries, e.g., China
and Russia and an old one for countries such as Colom-
bia and Argentina. It stems from the belief that local gov-
ernments have a comparative advantage in identifying
what is best for the local area and delivering the best
package to the area (Bahl 1992). This is called by McLure
(1997) as the "principle of subsidiarity" which means
increasing the local peoples influence over government
decisions affecting them.10 While the justification for de-
centralization is largely on allocative or efficiency grounds,
there are also political arguments in its favor (Tanzi 1995).
The argument for decentralization gained much
ground in the country because decentralization was con-
sidered an important component of participatory devel-
opment in the sense that the local areas will now be
involved in tax and expenditure decision processes. The
Philippines has gone a long way in decentralization with
the enactment into law of the Local Government Code of
1991. The Code lays down the framework and financing

10Oates (1968, 1972 and 1994) explains this very thoroughly.
11This is expected to increase to as much as 40 percent of national
tax revenues in 1998.
of decentralization and devolution of the delivery of cer-
tain public goods and resources. It is now a commonly-
accepted belief that there is no going back on decentrali-
zation. In fact, the local governments are clamoring for a
greater share in the tax revenues through an increase in
the internal revenue allotment (IRA).11
Decentralization requires the assignment of local
taxing powers and local expenditure responsibilities to
local governments. Through a grant system, local gov-
ernments are also given their share in national taxes or
claims on natural resources found in their territories. To
be effective, local governments must have adequate tax-
ing and spending powers. They must also have access to
official development assistance (ODAs) and the capital
markets.
Decentralization creates tension between the local
governments and the national government with respect
to the sharing of taxing and spending powers. The as-
signment of taxing powers, expenditure responsibilities
and the grant system may "reduce the flexibility of the
central government to pursue a stabilization program,
equalize services within the country and implement de-
velopment spending priorities" (Bahl 1992). The national
government may be pursuing macroeconomic policy ob-
jectives, e.g., low inflation, low domestic interest rates,
in order to attract both domestic and foreign investment
capital. However, this may not be possible if the national
government has yielded substantial tax and expenditure
responsibilities to the local governments. There could be
a divergence between local and national interests.
Thus, the difficult fiscal decision lies in balancing
local interests and the corresponding access to resources
to promote those local interests, on the one hand, and
allowing the national government to meet its macro-
economic policy objectives, on the other hand. For ex-7
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Table 2.  Assignment of Revenues from Major Taxes
to Levels of Government
Type of tax and assignments Justification
Individual income tax: national Macroeconomic stabilization
Income redistribution
Generalized benefit/revenue
Corporation income tax: national Macroeconomic stabilization
Income redistribution
Value added tax: national Generalized benefit/revenue
Business taxes: local Residence-related benefits
Excise taxes: national Specific benefits/cost of service
Natural resources: national/local National patrimony
Equity
Property taxes: local Specific benefits/cost of service

12Hommes (1995) views this as a political problem. The transfer of
taxing and spending power represents a shift of power without a guaran-
tee that a political equilibrium will ever take place. He cites the case of
Colombia where in his view political and budgetary gamesmanship is
taking place which has a negative impact on the fiscal picture.
13This is merely suggestive and does not take into account the ad-
ministrative feasibility of assigning certain taxes to a particular level of
government.
ample, national interest may require the building of a
certain infrastructure in a local area which may not be
seen as local priority interest. Funding this through a non-
inflationary way, i.e., through benefit taxation, may con-
flict with local demand for tax revenues. This will thus
require close policy coordination and cooperation between
the national and local governments. In this respect, a
way out may be to reduce the size of the national public
sector through privatization or the contracting of private
agents to deliver the public goods for a fee. This will elimi-
nate the conflicting demand for tax
revenues by the two levels of gov-
ernment.
Another area of choice lies in
assigning taxes. This is a difficult
and complicated field (McLure
1997, Tanzi 1995, Hommes
1995).12 McLure (1995, 1997) tries
to provide a normative solution by
citing Musgraves (1959) 3-branch
view of the public households, as-
signing income redistribution and
macroeconomic stabilization to the
central government but dividing the
allocation function among two or
more levels of government. If one
follows this formula, revenue as-
signment13 may be structured as
that shown in Table 2.
The problem may not be as
severe as discussed here. There
seems to be a continuing dialogue and openness between
the national government and local governments with re-
spect to the issue at hand. It is perhaps not a question
of choosing between centralization or decentralization but
rather of finding the happy mean between the two.
The main implication on competitiveness-building
lies in the fact that infrastructure may be more efficiently
provided by the local government (say, feeder roads, small
scale irrigation) than by the national government. There
could be instances, though, when provision must be cen-
trally provided because of scale economies and
externalitites. Thus, discussion of the degree of decen-
tralization/centralization is critical for competitiveness.
Resources are fungible and are easily dissipated unless
put to their most efficient use. Should a larger share of
the IRA be provided to local governments? Should the
national government retain more of the resources?8
Notes Policy
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The first lesson in economics is that resources are
scarce and must be efficiently allocated. We cannot sim-
ply assume an exogenously given expenditure set and
then raise the revenues, borrow or print money to finance
it. Difficult choices face policymakers each step of the
way.  4
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